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THERE HAS RECENTLY
BEEN AN INCREASED
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST
IN THIS AREA.
UNFORTUNATELY THIS IS
NOT DUE TO
POSITIVE TRENDS, BUT
BECAUSE OF A LACK OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
COMBINED WITH THE
ABSENCE OF POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION OF THE
LOCAL POPULATION IN
DECISION-MAKING
ilgit-Baltistan, a part of
Pakistanadministrated
Kashmir, is one of the
least known parts of South
Asia. There has however
recently been an increased
international interest in this
area. Unfortunately this is not
due topositive trends, likeeco-
nomicprosperity, social devel-
opment or free and fair elec-
tions as part of a stabilised
processof democratic consol-
idation but because of a lack
of human rights combined
with the absence of political
participationof the local pop-
ulation in decision-making.
Furthermore, the area came
into the spotlight because of
the growing influence of
Taliban like fundamentalist
forces which are contribute
heavily to the rise of sectarian
violence, despite the
‘omnipresent’ Pakistani secu-
rityapparatus.The recent large
scale sectarian violence in
Kohistan (February 28, 2012)
and Chilas (April 3, 2012)
which left dozens killed and
injured,wasanothersadexam-
pleof thedeteriorating lawand
order situation, raising inter-
national concerns. Despite
increasingviolenceandmedia
coverage Gilgit-Baltistan,
Baroness EmmaNicholson of
Winterbourne, a prominent
European politician spear-
heading the efforts of putting
this region on the agenda of
the international community,
describes these parts of the
worlds as “black holes”.
Therefore, a brief historical
contextualisation seems to be
inevitable in order to under-
stand the complexity of the
conflict.
Basically one can state, that
Gilgit-Baltistan (alsoknownas
Northern Areas), was an inte-
gral part of the former prince-
ly stateof JammuandKashmir
ruled by the Hindu Dogra
dynasty. Actually it’s is one of
twoareas -besides thesocalled
Azad (free) Jammu and
Kashmir- of the former Dogra
realm, which Pakistan took
over in the late 1940ties. After
thepartitionofBritish India in
1947, a rebellion among the
Muslim inhabitants brokeout
and the then still command-
ing British officer Major
William Brown of the Gilgit
Scoutsdecided tosidewith the
rebels and hand over the ter-
ritory to Pakistan. In fact, this
wasamilitarycoupagainst the
Maharaja of Kashmir, who at
the time officially was the
supremeauthority.As such the
accession to Pakistan lacks
legitimacy tremendously.
Nevertheless, large scale vio-
lent clashes between the
opposing factions, either in
favour of Pakistan, India or
independence as well as an
pre-empt invasion from pro-
Pakistani forces from neigh-
bouring areas like Swat were
avoided. The ‘accession’ how-
ever created a historical lega-
cy of a legal-constitutional
limbo, which was unfortu-
nately continuedbyPakistan’s
government which started to
keep this areaunder strict cen-
tral control which was inter-
preted as sine qua non for
national interests, especially
after the first war with India
over Kashmir, resulting in a
unsatisfying situation for
Islamabad.
This strategic rationale
gainedmoremomentumover
the lastdecades,as Indiancon-
ventional military superiority
became obvious, most visible
in the disastrous experiences
of the lost wars of 1965 and
1971.
In retrospect, it appears
today that Pakistan’s security
circles are followinga twofold-
approach regarding the
improvementof its position in
the Kashmir dispute:
First, beingaware that amil-
itary solution (meaning victo-
ry ina full-scalewarwith India)
is highly unlikely, they have
turned to goal achievement
through the use of ‘limited
coercive force’, either by regu-
lar army interventions (e.g.
Kargil conflict 1999)orbyprox-
ies in form of militant-non-
state actors like several Jihadi-
groups. However, due to the
failures of these measures -
Pakistan had to retreat from
Kargil and support for pro-
Pakistan elements in Indian
Jammu and Kashmir did not
help to achieve any political
goal- in and increasing inter-
nationalpressure it seems that
coercive forceasan instrument
in Pakistan’s India politics is
losing significance.
Nevertheless, regarding sever-
al analysts remarkable Jihadi
infrastructure inPakistancon-
trolled Kashmir still exists.
Second, since several devel-
opments, like the India-
Pakistan composite dialogue
and Islamabad’s urgent need
to boost economic develop-
ment, indicate that a political
solution is becoming a realis-
tic scenario. Having this in
mind, Pakistan is trying to
reduce the‘bargainingchip’. In
other words, by integrating
Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan,
Islamabad aims to delink the
area from Kashmir as such
reducing the disputed area
mainly to the Indian adminis-
tratedpart of the former colo-
nial state of Jammu and
Kashmir state.
In order to gain legitimacy
for absorbingGilgit-Baltistan,
Pakistan government officials
are stressing that this region
wasnever apart of the Jammu
&Kashmir, therefore any legal
commitments by the former
Maharaja regarding India
(especially the treaty of acces-
sion) does not include Gilgit-
Baltistan (‘Gilgit Agency
Controversy’). Therefore, the
integration of Gilgit-Baltistan
intoPakistan is justifiedand in
linewith the regulations setby
the former British colonial
rulers in order to implement
the transferofpoweraswell as
the partition of British India.
But thismanoeuvre also has a
down side from a Pakistani
perspective. If Islamabad offi-
cially annexesGilgit-Baltistan,
this means that Pakistan will
indirectly lose its normative
argumentagainst India’s incor-
porationof Jammu&Kashmir
(the Indian administered part
of Kashmir). Therefore,
Islamabad has to walk a thin
line between giving Gilgit-
Baltistan a certain constitu-
tional status and subsequent-
ly political rights on one side,
and avoid the impression of a
consequent, constitutional
integrationof thisarea.The for-
mer would lead to a violation
of thependingUNresolutions
of 13th August 1948 and 5th
January 1949, which envisage
that the future status of the
state of Jammu and Kashmir
will be determined in accor-
dancewith thewill of thepeo-
ple through the democratic
methodof a freeand impartial
plebiscite. These UN resolu-
tions are of great significance
for Islamabad, since at least in
theory, they keep the option
that the people of Kashmir
might vote in favour of
Pakistan.This ispredominantly
whyunlike India, Pakistanhas
hesitated to annex Gilgit-
Baltistan.
Islamabad’s strategy of
demotion -which gradually
began under the rule of
General Zia-ul-Haq- turning
Gilgit-Baltistan into to a pure
’bargaining chip’ of negotia-
tion in its foreignaffairs, is not
anewphenomenon. Inamod-
ified version it had already
been applied in 1963 as the
Pakistan government handed
over parts of Gilgit-Baltistan,
namely Shaksgam and
Muztaghvalleys (around2300
squaremiles), toBeijingunder
the Pakistan-China boundary
agreement. From a Pakistani
perspective thiswas interpret-
ed as a cunningmove, since it
reduced the amount of dis-
putable landmass adminis-
tered by Islamabad and also
appeasedChina,amuchneed-
edally.The implicationsof this
alliancebecameevidentwhen
China started investing heav-
ily inmajordevelopmentproj-
ects such as the Karakorum
Highway, which is until today
the only highway in Gilgit-
Baltistan, or the Gwadar Port
project in the neglected state
of Balochistan, as well as sig-
nificant technology transfer
crucial for the country’s mili-
tary and nuclear build-up. In
this context, one must state
that Gilgit-Baltistan is also
great significance to China.
Only apolitically stableGilgit-
BaltistanunderPakistani con-
trol seems to serve Chinese
interests, which would imply
secure access to the Arabian
Sea. But like inother cases, for
example neighbouring
Afghanistan, the respective
people do not play a factor in
the bilateral state relations,
especially when it comes to
political participation and
decision-making or sharing
economic benefits.
As Pakistan’s rivalry with
Indian and Chinese interests
in the region indicate, Gilgit-
Baltistan is doubtless of
extraordinary strategic signif-
icance for Islamabad.The fact
that this region is theonlypart
whichbordersChina, India as
well asAfghanistan (whichhas
historically adifficult relation-
shipwithPakistan), underpins
the strategic value of Gilgit-
Baltistan.Beinganxiousabout
anti-Islamabad tendencies in
Balochistan aswell as in other
provinces, all Pakistani admin-
istrations – military as well as
civilian – are trying hard to
keep Gilgit-Baltistan under
tight control in order to avoid
further vulnerability.Having in
mind, that Pakistan must be
clearly identified as a case of
failed civilian control, espe-
cially in the areas of national
defense and internal security,
it is obvious that all decision-
making in and about Gilgit-
Baltistan is made by the mili-
tary. Therefore, it does not
come by surprise that
Islamabad’s policy in Gilgit-
Baltistan is exclusively domi-
nated by the security para-
digm.Subsequently, onemust
state that Pakistan is just con-
tinuing the approach of the
British colonial ruler securing
its own borders and territory,
perceived as top priority.
However, this is not a phe-
nomena limited to Gilgit-
Baltistan, it is a characteristic
of Pakistani politicswhichcan
be found in all regions in the
country’s history, especially in
the bloody war of independ-
ence in former East Pakistan,
today Bangladesh.
In order to keep Gilgit-
Baltistan incheck, thePakistani
government has applied dif-
ferent strategies with remark-
able negative effects for the
indigenous population.
First, thenational leadership
decided to support a Sunni
Islamisation based on radical
Wahabi ideology. Historically,
the natives of Gilgit-Baltistan
were predominantly Shia and
othernon-Sunnicommunities.
Butmost importantly, besides
somesectarianism,during the
reign of the Maharaja of
Kashmir, there were hardly
conflicts between thedifferent
ethnic-religious communities
in the region. However, this
changed rapidly after Zia-ul-
Haq in the 1970/80ties
enforced a policy of
Islamisation in thewholecoun-
try, but especially in theareaof
Gilgit-Baltistan. Witnessing a
Shia revolution in neighbour-
ing Iran, the country’s political
elite was concerned about a
Shia majority area within its
own borders. In reaction,
Islamabad supported a Sunni
Islamisation by granting
Sunni’s extraordinary privi-
leges, benefits andpreferential
treatment inall spheresofpub-
lic life.Aprocesswhichwasalso
massively supported by Saudi
Arabia, which at the time, felt
the need to create a ‘Sunni
Wahabi Wall’ to contain the
influence of Teheran.
Second, this Sunni
Islamisation strategy was
flanked by efforts by a ‘guided
and armoured migration’ to
change thedemographyof the
Gilgit-Baltistan.Moreprecise-
ly, in order to reduce the Shia
to a minority, Islamabad
encouragedSunnipeople from
other parts of Pakistan to set-
tle down the area, which not
only evoked tensionsbetween
natives andmigrants but also
brought the thenstill unknown
Shia-Sunnidivide into this iso-
latedmountainous region.The
most dramatic indication
therefore, was the outbreak of
the sectarian clashes of 1988
in which several hundreds of
people lost their life.
Third, actionsaimedat con-
taining and/or eliminating
anti-critical elements in the
political sphere.Thiswasdone
in two ways: By introducing
and siding with pro-Pakistani
parties like the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) and
PakistanMuslimLeague(PML-
Q) and by restricting political
activitiesof thepolitical oppo-
sition,whichwasnot acting in
the interest of Islamabad.
Beingahighlydiverseand frag-
mented society, it was not an
extraordinarily challenging
task to control the locals and
weaken thepro-independence
camp.
In consequence, having the
perceptionofbeing treated like
an ‘internal colony’, there is a
significant increase in
demands for greater autono-
myand self-governance, even
independenceby sub-nation-
al groups within Gilgit-
Baltistan. Additionally suffer-
ing from dramatic economic
underdevelopmentandapoor
social infrastructure despite
rich natural resources, the
inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan
are getting further alienated
from the Pakistani state.
However, instead of address-
ing the issues raised,
Islamabad has responded in
its usual way by promising
reformsandtoacertaindegree
deciding on them but not
implementing them, either
because of endemic corrup-
tion, the shortageof resources
or a lack of political will. Most
likelyacombinationofall these
factors which leads subse-
quently to the use of all kinds
of political instruments to
maintain control over the
region, ranking from threat-
ening and harassment of the
opposition tophysicallyattack-
ingprotestersandcarryingout
targeted killings of political
activists. Subsequently, being
not only confronted with
socio-cultural and religious
deprivation through theSunni
Islamisation policy, but also
withpolitically-economicmar-
ginalisationandcoercive sup-
pression,Gilgit-Baltistan iswit-
nessing periodical militant
upheavals in formof riots and
other acts of violence.Thedis-
proportionate reaction of
Pakistan’s Security Forces is
causing furtherdiscontentand
creating an unending vicious
circle of violence.
Consequently, the alienated
people of Gilgit-Baltistan are
increasingly constructing their
own national identity. This
finds its expression in a rise of
separatist movement organi-
sationsdemandingsome form
of autonomyoroutright inde-
pendence. Facing steadily
growing anti-Pakistan senti-
ments, the political establish-
ment has been finally con-
vinced that they have tomake
certain political concessions.
Islamabad reacted in 2009 by
issuing the Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-
GovernanceOrder (GBESGO),
which not only renamed the
region from Northern Areas
into Gilgit-Baltistan but also
made this region “more look-
ing like” Pakistan’s fifth
province. One of the major
advancements was the
strengthening –at least for-
mally- of the already existing
Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative
Assembly (GBLA). But critics
are claiming that theGBESGO
is just an attempt to calm the
opposition in GB as well as to
please the international com-
munity. Here, one can state
that any steps toward improv-
ing political rights and liber-
ties as promised by the
GBESGO was carried out
becauseofdiplomaticpressure
from the international com-
munity, especially by the
European Union and related
organizations like the‘Friends
of Gilgit-Baltistan’, a group of
members of the European
Parliament under the leader-
ship MEP Juergen
Creutzmann. In fact, thepolit-
ical opposition in Gilgit-
Baltistan is concerned that
when it comes to Realpolitik
there will be no substantial
change in the existing power
structure since the supreme
political authority in the region
is vested in the governor who
is appointed by the President
of Pakistan. Additionally, the
legislative power of the GB
region has been restricted
additionally by a newly set up
Gilgit-BaltistanCouncil (GBC),
headed by the PrimeMinister
of Pakistan, which functions
as a controlling body of the
central government for this
region by taking away signifi-
cant powers from the legisla-
tive assembly.
To sumup, itmight be diffi-
cult to grant the people of
Gilgit-Baltistan representation
in thePakistaniparliamentdue
to the nature of international
obligations and binding UN
resolutions on Kashmir, but
that isno justification fordeny-
ing themanysubstantialpolit-
ical rights and liberties. In this
context, the GBESGO, like its
predecessor the 1994 Legal
Framework Order, remains a
toothless tiger when it comes
to safeguardingpeople’s inter-
est. Until now, Islamabadwas
able tokeep theoppositionon
a low-profile.But the locals are
starting to perceive the
Pakistani state as ambiguous
when it comes to introducing
so called ‘reform packages’ –
even more, they evaluate
Islamabad’s agencies to some
extent as an occupying force.
Subsequently, the opposi-
tion is growing and it will be
more costly to suppress it in
the future. Therefore, time is
running out for the Pakistan’s
establishment to access and
incorporate the demands of
the people,– namely democ-
racy, human rights as well as
socio-economic well-being -
otherwise the situation will
turn as almost everything in
Pakistan from bad to worse.
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alestine has accom-
plished a historic
achievement at the
UN when the UN General
Assembly granted the
Palestinians non-member
state observer status in a
138-9 vote. To become a
member of the community
of international state or to
becomea state, recognition
is extremely important.
Whether richorpoor, every
independent country is a
member of the UN. But in
caseofPalestine, itwasadif-
ferent picture. But through
securing upgraded UN sta-
tus, the Palestinians now
have a state. But the ques-
tion thatnowcomesnow to
the fore is: what next?What
is the real significanceof this
UN status? Will the Israel
and United States allow to
an independent Palestine
state? If so, thenwhatare the
challenges? And most
importantly, will the UN
recognition resolve the long
term Palestine-Israel con-
flict?
Last year, Palestinians
tried to get full state mem-
bership at the United
Nationsbut failed.This year,
it secured recognition from
the UN which will give the
Palestinians access to a
rangeof international insti-
tutions, including all UN
agencies and treaties, inch-
ing closer to getting legal
rights over its air space and
waters, challenging con-
tentious Jewish settlements
- evenbringingwar charges
against Israel in the
International Criminal
Court. Without any doubt,
these are potentially huge
gains.
In 2009, the Palestinian
Authority pressed the court
to investigateaccusationsof
war crimes committed by
Israeli commanders during
the war in Gaza against
Hamasmilitants, including
the charge that Israel had
singledoutciviliansand ille-
gally used weapons like
whitephosphorus.But since
it had no recognition as a
state, it failed. But now,
Palestine canhaveaccess to
the International Criminal
Court, and thepossibility of
bringingwar crimecharges
against Israelbecomesmore
tangible. In this regard, a
spokesman for the
Palestinian Mission at the
UnitedNationshadsaid,“In
2009, we approached the
ICC, and the only thing
pendingwas theywanted a
legal document saying
Palestine was a state. And
now theyhave it” (TheNew
York Times, November 30,
2012).
Total US opposition and
its veto at the UN Security
Council haveprevented the
Palestinians from attaining
UN full membership. But,
thisnewUNstatusalso indi-
cates global criticism of
Israel and the US on the
peace process front and
support for the state of
Palestine, toPalestine's free-
dom, to Palestine's inde-
pendence,no toaggression,
no to settlements, no to
occupation. These are the
significances of the UN
recognition to Palestine.
At thesametime, thereare
challenges to be overcome.
Washingtonhaswarnedthat
it could withhold funds to
the already cash-strapped
Palestinian Authority, and
Israel said it would not
transfer millions of dollars
it collects in tax funds for the
Palestinians in response to
the UN bid (The Daily Star,
December 03, 2012).
Furthermore, Israel revealed
plans to build 3,000 settler
homes ineast Jerusalemand
theWest Bank in response
to the bid. (The Daily Star,
December 3, 2012).
Another important point
is that, Israel is trying to ille-
gitimaise Palestine’s recog-
nitionormake it ineffective.
Forexample, Israel’s ambas-
sador to theUnitedNations,
Ron Prosor, said that the
newstatuswouldnotenable
thePalestinianAuthority to
join international treaties,
organisations or confer-
ences as a state and does
“notconfer statehoodonthe
PalestinianAuthority,which
clearly fails tomeet the cri-
teria for statehood.” (The
NewYorkTimes,November
30, 2012).
Since the Second World
War, no other conflict has
attracted asmuch constant
attention as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The
Middle East conflict has
beenoneof themajorprob-
lems in international rela-
tions. It has remained an
areaof conflict andviolence
for long. But why does the
international community
not come forward to resolve
64 years Arab- Israeli con-
flict, a conflict that ulti-
mately affect, directly or
indirectly, international
peace and security?
It is time to resolve the
MiddleEast crisis.The inter-
national community should
comeforward towardsa rea-
sonable solution.
International pressure
should be created on Israel
to freeze the expansion of
settlements, which the
Palestinian side has been
urging for long. Finally,both
the sides (i.e. Israel-
Palestine)must agree to the
point that armed conflict
can never bring any solu-
tion, however powerful a
nation Israel might be, and
whatever hatred the
Palestinians might hold in
their heart.
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